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TRADE CREDIT AND CREDIT CRUNCHES: EVIDENCE FOR SPANISH FIRMS 
FROM THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS
This article uses data from 1994-2010 to analyse the patterns and determinants of the 
trade credit received and given by Spanish firms for a wide period of time that includes the 
financial crisis. Additionally, following García-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2011), I 
will use a differences-in-differences approach to identify whether firms with a better 
liquidity position (higher external financial dependence) prior to 2007 increased their 
extension (use) of trade credit to compensate the effect of the contraction in the supply of 
bank credit in the first years of the crisis.
The banking sector plays a key role in most economies transferring funds from savers to 
borrowers. Banks provide funds to firms and households, so that investment and 
consumption can be made without exclusively relying on internal funds. Although it is not 
the only source of external finance, bank credit is one of the most important ones. But, 
what happens when banks cannot fulfil this important function? What happens when 
firms are not able to borrow from banks due to an external shock that it is not related to 
the former?
To be able to find evidence of a bank credit crunch, our main variable of interest is one 
close substitute for bank credit, trade credit. This type of credit is the one that is given by 
suppliers to their clients in the form of the deferment of the payment for the delivered 
goods by the supplier. Thus, firms can pay for the goods to their suppliers after they 
receive them. Despite the fact that this form of financing is much more expensive than 
bank credit [Wilner (2000)], it is widely used by firms. In Spain in 2010, trade credit extended 
(“Accounts Receivable”) accounted for almost 30% of the firms’ financial total assets, 
whereas trade credit used (“Accounts Payable”) accounted for almost 20% of the financial 
total liabilities.
We will focus on two aspects in this paper. The first one is to study the evolution and 
patterns of trade credit in Spain in the last 15 years. Specifically, we will try to understand 
how the aspects of trade credit taken and extended have evolved during this period, 
which ends with the global banking crisis. Moreover, we will also study the most 
important determinants for both trade credit extended and trade credit taken by Spanish 
firms. The second aspect we focus on is to understand how firms react to an external 
shock that presumably affected banks’ lending capacity in the first place, the 2007 
financial crisis.
It is important to notice that we study both aspects of trade credit separately because 
there could be different forces, which could be not related at all, that determine trade 
credit extended and trade credit taken and if we aggregate both, we would not be able to 
distinguish them and misunderstand the results we obtain.
Our data comes from the Central de Balances, a data base collected by the Bank of Spain 
and consists of 33,321 Spanish firms for the period 1993-2010. We perform some filters to 
clean our data from outliers and some inconsistencies, which will be detailed in the Data 
Section. We will work with two samples: one for trade credit extended and another one for 
trade credit taken. After having performed all filters, our final samples have 11,483 and 
10,061 firms respectively.
1 Introduction
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 58 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 23
The hypothesis tested in the paper is that the variable Accounts Receivable over Sales 
(AR) and the variable accounts payable over purchases (AP) depend on a variable, different 
for each one, that measure the financial slack of the firm granting or receiving trade credit. 
Moreover, since the financial crisis limits the access to banks’ finance, we hypothesize that 
the volume of trade credit granted or received will be more sensitive to the financial slack 
variable in the years of the financial crisis than in the years before. The empirical model 
explains the dependent variables AR and AP as a function of the slack variable and other 
control variables, including year and industry or firm dummy variables. We also interact the 
financial slack variable by the time dummy variables of years 2008-2010.
For the first regression, AR, the financial slack variable is Liquidity, measured as Cash over 
Total Assets. The hypothesis is that firms might react in a different manner when the crisis 
arrives depending on the level of liquidity that they had the year before. Regarding this 
slack variable, we find two results: first, the estimated coefficient of liquidity is negative, 
meaning that firms with higher levels of liquidity extend less trade credit than the less liquid 
ones. Second, the interaction terms between liquidity and the crisis years have positive 
estimated coefficients, which indicate that although liquidity has a negative effect on AR, 
this negative effect becomes less negative during the crisis. In other words, the increase 
(decrease) in AR is higher (lower) for more liquid firms. We also provide robustness results 
presenting separate estimates for small and for large firms.
For the second regression, AP, the financial slack variable is External Finance Dependence 
(EFD), defined as the proportion of the investments that are not covered by the cash flow 
generated by the firm. In this case, the estimated coefficients of EFD and of the interaction 
of EFD with the years of the crisis are either not statistically significant or significant but 
with an estimated coefficient close to zero. The results are robust to other definitions of the 
financial slack variable. Over all, the explanatory power of the model is much lower than in 
the AR case, so at this point of the research it is unclear what the determinants of trade 
credit received by firms are, although we provide some tentative explanation of this result.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we will review the previous literature 
regarding trade credit, commenting on the classic papers and on the most recent ones 
that are very close to this one and the contribution of this work. Then, in section 3, we will 
describe the empirical strategy we are going to use, define our main variables and the 
regression equations that we are going to perform. After that, in section 4, we will describe 
the data and the filters we have applied. In section 5 we start describing our Accounts 
Receivable results and we do the same for our Accounts Payable results in section 6. 
Finally, section 7 concludes with a brief summary of the paper, the comparison with the 
papers of the trade credit literature and the most important conclusions.
Trade credit is an important source of finance, especially for medium and small firms. The 
literature about trade credit is vast and always starts by asking the same question: why 
does trade credit exist when there are specialized institutions for this particular purpose (i.e. 
banks)? The answer relies on its advantages over other sources of finance and, most 
notably, over bank finance: information acquisition, monitoring the buyer and greater 
efficiency in liquidation [Petersen and Rajan (1997)]. Firstly, suppliers are better at monitoring 
their customers than banks are since, over the course of the relationship between supplier 
and customer, the former is very likely to know how good or bad is the business’ condition 
of the latter [Smith (1987)]. Secondly, suppliers can threaten firms to stop providing goods 
if debts are not paid. This threat is more credible if the supplier has more clients than this 
particular firm. The stronger the relationship between supplier and client is, the more 
 2 Previous literature
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 59 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 23
harmful would be the loss experienced by the firm if the supplier stops providing the goods 
[Cuñat (2007)]. Lastly, in the case of default, the supplier may have an advantage in 
recovering its debt from the debtor either by repossessing unused inventory or by his 
access to an industry network where he could sell the liquidated assets of his former client.
The financial crisis that started in 2007 has provided a new perspective of analysing the 
degree of substitutability between bank lending and other sources of external finance. It is 
commonly admitted that the crisis has provoked a bank credit crunch and several 
researchers are using the start of the crisis (or some of its landmarks) as an exogenous and 
unexpected shock to bank credit supply. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that new 
lending in 2008 was significantly lower than new lending in 2007 and that the decline in 
new loans accelerated during the banking panic (fourth quarter of 2008). Becker and 
Ivashina (2011) consider bonds as substitutes for bank lending. They find that conditioning 
on the issuance of new debt, an abnormal number of firms switched from bank loans to 
bonds, which is consistent with a bank credit supply contraction. 
There are two papers that are closely related to this one. García-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga (2011) study how trade credit varies with the credit crunch originated by the 
financial crisis. They focus on large US firms and use a differences-in-differences estimation 
strategy to find whether firms with higher (lower) liquidity positions before the crisis 
increased (decreased) the trade credit extended to other firms. They exclude firms with 
market capitalization less than $50 million or whose book value of assets is less than $10 
million and those displaying asset or sales growth exceeding 100%. The other related 
paper is by Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernández and Udell (2012), who study whether 
during the financial crisis trade credit provided an alternative source of external finance to 
SMEs in Spain. All firms they use for their analysis are below 40€ million in total assets. 
They use a disequilibrium model to identify firms that are credit constrained and find that 
they make greater use of trade credit (“Accounts Payable”) in the crisis. Our paper will 
integrate the both sides of trade credit: the trade credit extended and trade credit taken. 
Additionally, we will use a sample of small, medium and large Spanish firms from 1994 to 
2010. We will follow García-Appendini and Montoriol Garriga in using a differences-in-
differences approach in order to identify variation of trade credit extended and taken by 
firms depending on the respective financial slack variable when the crisis arrives, as 
detailed in the next section.
When we compare our work with these two papers, we can see that: firstly, regarding García-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga paper, our main conclusion is the same as theirs: at the 
start of the crisis, trade credit extended increases more (or decreases less) for firms holding 
more liquidity. This fact can be seen in the interaction coefficient between liquidity and the 
year 2008, the start of the crisis. Regarding the second paper, the one by Carbó-Valverde et 
al., we cannot say the same: there is no clear evidence for which trade credit taken increases 
during the crisis years, as there is no significant interaction coefficient between a slack 
variable (we have tried many). One could think that this happens because we do not split the 
sample by size for trade credit extended, since the second paper studies SME, but we 
should keep in mind that more than 85% of our sample consists of small and medium firms, 
so had we split the sample by size, we would have probably got the same results.
We will measure the trade credit given by firms as Accounts Receivable and trade credit 
taken by firms as Accounts Payable and will scale them by Sales and Purchases 
respectively so as to facilitate the comparisons across firms of different sizes. Thus, 
these two ratios, Accounts Receivable over Sales (AR) and Accounts Payable over 
3 Empirical strategy
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Purchases (AP), will be our dependent variables. Our two baseline equations will be 
as follows:
where 
In the first equation,  0 is the intercept;  1 is a vector of coefficients associated with the 
vector of control variables X it , vector which includes, among other variables, industry and 
size dummies (unless the equation is estimated with fixed effects). The variable yst is a year 
dummy that takes value one for the year we are analysing (t = s). The year dummies 
coefficients are sAR and coefficients of the interaction terms between the crisis years and 
our financial slack variable for AR, FS itAR, are sAR. Similarly for the second regression, these 
terms are  0, which is the intercept,  1, the vector of coefficients associated with 
the vector of control variables Z it ,  sAP, the crisis dummy year coefficients and sAP, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms between the crisis years and our financial slack 
variable for AP, FS itAP.
The financial slack variable is a proxy for how tied the financial constraint for each firm and 
it is interacted with the crisis years (2008, 2009 and 2010). This interaction allows for the 
possibility that firms might react in a different manner when granting or receiving trade 
credit when the crisis arrives, presumably in 2008, depending on the financial position of 
the firm in the year before. Several variables will be considered for both equations, but we 
have one good variables will be considered for both equations, but we have one preferred 
candidate for each equation: Liquidity for the AR regression and External Finance 
Dependence (EFD) for the AP regression.
Regarding the first equation, the hypothesis is that firms with higher liquidity might react 
differently than firms with lower liquidity and thus the trade credit extended by these two 
types of firms might be different when the crisis arrives. If trade credit is a substitute for 
bank finance, we expect that the increase in trade credit extended for firms with more 
levels of liquidity just before the crisis is higher than this increase for firms with less liquidity. 
For the second equation, we consider the variable EFD. This variable measures the 
shortage of internally generated funds in financing new investments. Firms with more EFD 
might react differently when taking trade credit when the crisis arrives. As before, if trade 
credit is a substitute for bank finance, we expect that the increase of trade credit taken is 
higher for firms with more needs of external finance than this increase for firms with less 
need of external finance in the crisis years.
Finally, we will estimate both regressions with two different estimation methods: Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Effects (FE). Even though we perform and report the results 
under both methods of estimation, we will comment on the results concerning only FE. We 
will assume unobserved heterogeneity among firms, since there could be some factors 
that vary for each firm and we do not observe, like for instance how good or bad the firm 
is being managed, but could be important and influence some of our results. We will not 
use regressors with no or very little variation over time (size and industry sector dummies). 
All the controls will be lagged one period in order to reduce multicollineality and reverse 
causality problems.
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The data we will use is from the Central de Balances, a data base elaborated by the Bank 
of Spain and that contains the accounting statements (balance sheet and income 
statement) voluntarily provided every year by Spanish non financial firms. We have data 
from 1993 to 2010.
Our initial sample consists of 163,481 observations from 33,321 firms for the period 1993-
2010. The panel data is incomplete so firms that only appear in the data base before the 
crisis period but do not appear in the years of the crisis are kept in the data base. We 
perform several filters to clean the data from inconsistencies and outliers. We exclude 
public utilities, i.e., those firms in Water Transportation, Water Services, Gas Services and 
Electric Services industries. This is done because these types of firms are usually heavily 
regulated. Additionally, we eliminate observations of firms with negative or zero Assets, 
negative or zero Operating Revenues, negative or zero Cash and Short Term Financial 
Assets, and observations where the sum of Short Term Financial Assets and Cash is higher 
than the Assets.
Then we eliminate observations where the growth rate of Assets is more than one, since 
these are most likely to correspond to firms that have merged or experienced other 
significant restructuring. We also eliminate observations where the growth rate of total 
Assets or the growth rate of Sales is less than –0.8 since these are most likely to be firms 
in the process of liquidation or division of Assets.
From this point, we will work with two different samples: one for AR and one for AP. For the 
first sample, we eliminate observations where AR is negative or more than one. When 
applying the last filter, we drop about 1% of the observations that we had in the sample at 
that time. For the second sample, we eliminate observations where AP is negative or more 
than five, filter which eliminates also the 1% of the remaining observations when that filter 
was applied.
Next, for each sample we also eliminate observations for years in which we directly know 
that firms have experienced a merge, split or cession. We also drop observations where 
the ratio between Equity and Assets is less than –1 because we want to eliminate firms 
that are about to become bankrupt. When we apply this filter for the both samples, we 
eliminate 0.3% of the observations. If we had applied the filter using –0.5 instead of –1, the 
percentage of deleted observations would have been 0.6%.1
We eliminate firms with missing information on their industrial classification and firm-
observations for which year t – 1 data are not available (since the explanatory variables are 
lagged on period the value of the explanatory variable would not be available for these 
firms). Finally, we eliminate firms with less than three valid observations over the whole 
period of analysis.
Our final sample for AR consist of 93,091 observations from 11,483 firms for the period 
1994-2010, whereas for AP consist of 82,393 observations from 10,061 firms for the 
same period.
4 Data
1  One could argue that the filter should be 0, instead of –1 or –0.5, but applying this filter would have eliminated 
almost 3% of the observations. First, deleted observations would have been too many for this filter, and most 
importantly, we would have dropped observations where we would not have been taking into account the future 
value of the firm. There could be firms whose future Equity value is positive and thus are worth being kept in our 
samples. Although this filter can be easily criticised, the important aspect that we should look at is the fact that 
results do not change substantially when we perform this filter using –1 or 0. 
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In this section, we will describe all the results concerning the first regression, where AR is 
the dependent variable. The equation in section 3 constitutes our baseline regression. 
After this, we will expand this equation and will include more explanatory variables. 
Specifically, we will include the interaction between our financial slack variable (liquidity), 
the crisis years and a size dummy (that takes value one for large firms and zero for small 
firms) and we will interact these three terms first two by two and then the three of them 
simultaneously. We define small and medium firms as firms with less than 250 employees 
and large firms as firms with 250 or more employees. Finally in this section, we will split the 
sample in two, according to size: one sample will consist of small and medium firms and 
the other of large firms.
The list of variables used in the analysis, together with the definition of each of them, 
appears in Table 1.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 describe our baseline results. In column 1 we use an OLS 
estimation method, whereas in column 2 we use a Fixed Effect estimation method. The 
explanatory variables in the FE estimation exclude all the variables without time variability, 
such as the size dummy variables. As explained above, we will only comment the FE 
results.
Chart 1 shows the pattern of AR according to size, with the 95% confidence intervals. We 
can see that small firms give more trade credit than large firms. The coefficients we see in 
Chart 1 are the dummy year coefficients obtained in our first regression using a FE 
estimation. Trade credit extended by firms increases with size up to firms that have 
between 50 and 99 employees. From this point, trade credit decreases with size. Thus, it 
is clear that large firms extend less trade credit than small firms and that medium size firms 
are the ones that extend the most trade credit of all.
Now let us look at the estimated coefficients of the year dummies. Chart 2, which has the 
estimated coefficients of the year dummies using a FE estimation, shows that the evolution 
of these coefficients is stable over time and they increase only from year 2008 indicating 
that the crisis starting in 2008 has had some effect on the provision of trade credit given 
by firms.
5 Accounts receivable
5.1 BASELINE RESULTS
Variable De?nition
AR Accounts receivable / Sales
AP Accounts payable / Purchases
LIQ (Cash + Short term ?nancial assets ) / Total assets
Age Actual year – First year of the ?rm
Net pro?t margin EBIDTA / Total operating revenues
Sales growth Growth rate of sales
Assets growth Growth rate of total assets
Long term liabilities over assets Long term liabilities / assets
Equity over assets Equity / Total assets
EFD [(Capital assets at t – Capital assets at t – 1) – EBIDTA] / Capital assets at t
Short term bank borrowings Short term bank debt / Total assets
Long term bank borrowings Long term bank debt / Total assets
Financial Expenses Financial expenses (incl. Interest payments) / Total assets
  
VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS TABLE 1
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Regarding the regressors, we see that we only have two statistically significant ones: Sales 
growth and Liquidity. Firstly, we see that the estimated coefficient of Sales growth is statistically 
significant, with an estimated coefficient of –0.0062, whereas Liquidity has an estimated 
coefficient of –0.0463, meaning that firms with high sales growth and more liquid firms extend 
less trade credit: an increase in Sales growth in 10% reduces AR by 0.06%, while an increase 
in 10% of Liquidity reduces AR by 0.46%. We have also that the estimated coefficient of the 
dummy variable for large firm is statistically significant and negative, meaning that large firms 
extend less trade credit than small firms, fact that is confirmed by Chart 2.
The negative estimated coefficients of Sales growth and Liquidity indicate that firms with 
high sales growth and firms with high liquidity extend less trade credit than firms with low 
sales growth or low liquidity. Regarding the first variable, Sales growth, we could think that 
firms that grow at higher rates can afford to select their customers, and thus selling to the 
ones that need less trade credit. Regarding the second regressor, firms with high liquidity 
might want to preserve it, maybe because they want to do investments projects that 
require a lot of trade credit, because they are in a sector that demands lots of liquidity or 
because they demand liquidity to protect themselves against negative external shocks. 
Alternatively, we could have in this case a reverse causality issue: firms with high trade 
credit have lower liquidity because they finance their customers.
Now let us analyse the interaction terms. We see that only the estimated coefficient for the 
interaction term between liquidity and the year 2008 is statistically significant. This means 
that, although liquidity has a negative effect on AR, this negative effect becomes less 
negative during the first year of the crisis, 2008. Also we know this year has had a positive 
effect on AR, but this effect is higher for more liquid firms. Thus, the increase in trade credit 
SIZE COEFFICIENTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AT 95% FOR TRADE CREDIT EXTENDED CHART 1
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extended is higher for firms with more liquidity. For example, the interaction coefficient for 
2008 is –0.0163. This means that if firm A has 10% more liquidity than firm B, the former 
will increase (decrease) their trade credit extended by 0.16% more (less) than the latter will 
do in 2008. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that firms with high levels of pre-
crisis liquidity act as substitutes for banks when the crisis arrives. But is this positive effect 
of liquidity on AR when the crisis arrives, in 2008, high enough to offset the total negative 
effect? To see the answer, we have to look at the marginal effect of liquidity on AR during 
2008. In the years previous to the start of the crisis, where we do not have any interaction 
terms, this effect is –0.0463. When the crisis arrives in 2008, this effect becomes less 
negative, –0.03. Hence, liquidity still has a negative impact on AR, even in 2008. But this 
negative effect is less intense during this year. This negative effect decreases by 36% in 
2008. However, the same does not happen during the next two years of the crisis, 2009 
and 2010. One reason could be that suppliers are willing to extend more trade credit at the 
beginning of the crisis, thinking that this crisis is going to be temporary, but when they see 
how deep the crisis is, they possibly decide to stop behaving like banks and thus they go 
back to act like they were acting before the crisis. So there is no effect of the years 2009 
and 2010 in the provision of trade credit.
Now we move to column 4 of Table 2, which show the results of the regression when we 
interact liquidity, which is our financial slack variable, the crisis years and a size dummy, 
which takes value 1 for large firms. As explained above, we have interacted liquidity with 
Constant  0.2396*** (14.86) 0.2525*** (24.55)  0.2695*** (17.05) 0.2237*** (57.62)
Age   0.0006*** (7.26) 0.0001 (-0.44)   0.0005*** (7.03) 0.0000 (-0.51)
Sales growth -0.0126*** (-7.67) -0.0062*** (-4.51) -0.0134*** (-8.08) -0.0063*** (-4.58)
Net pro?t margin   0.0009*** (3.28) 0.0001 (0.85)   0.0010*** (3.23) 0.0001 (0.80)
Long term liabilities / Assets -0.1294*** (-15.43) 0.0017 (0.24) -0.1397*** (-16.64) 0.0032 (0.47)
Equity / Assets -0.0314*** (-5.00) 0.0111 (1.62) -0.0337*** (-5.31) 0.0143 (2.16)
Liquidity -0.1535*** (-18.54) -0.0463*** (-7.05) -0.1536*** (-16.73) -0.0409*** (-5.49)
Large ?rm (size dummy) -0.0075*** (-2.81) -0.0158*** (-3.76) 0.0015 (0.33)
Liquidity * large ?rm - - - - -0.0446** (-2.39) -0.0257** (-2.06)
Liquidity * year 2008   0.0553*** (4.37) 0.0163* (1.62)   0.0670*** (4.50) 0.0216* (1.80)
Liquidity * year 2009   0.0434*** (3.19) 0.0073 (-0.66)   0.0472*** (2.99) -0.0101 (-0.76)
Liquidity * year 2010   0.0501*** (3.37) 0.0060 (-0.49)   0.0525*** (3.11) -0.0047 (-0.33)
Year 2008 * large - - - - 0.0202*** (3.38) 0.0210*** (4.40)
Year 2009 * large - - - - 0.0072 (1.05) 0.0083 (1.57)
Year 2010 * large - - - - 0.0019 (0.23) 0.0113 (1.86)
Liquidity * year 2008 * large - - - - -0.0115 (-0.42) -0.0028 (-0.13)
Liquidity * year 2009 * large - - - - 0.0196 (0.65) 0.0278 (1.16)
Liquidity * year 2010 * large - - - - 0.0193 (0.56) 0.0077 (0.30)
Estimation method
R-squared
Observations
Firms
OLS
0.1368
79,125
11,483
FE
0.0057
79,125
11,483
OLS
0.1445
79,125
11,843
FE
0.0003
79,125
11,843
1 2 3 4
  
TRADE CREDIT EXTENDED BY FIRMS TABLE 2
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
NOTE: This table presents estimates from an unbalanced panel regressions explaining ?rm-level annual trade credit provided for the period 1994-2010. The 
dependent variable is Accounts Receivable over Sales. The ?rst and third columns show the estimates using OLS and the second and fourth ones using FE. Liquidity 
is calculated as the sum of Cash and Short term ?nancial assets scaled by Total assets. All controls are lagged one period. Standard errors in parenthesis, next to 
the coef?cients. ***, ** and * indicate signi?cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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the crisis years because more liquid firms might react differently from less liquid firms, 
extending more or less trade credit, when the crisis arrives. Using the same argument, we 
can think of this size dummy as a way to capture the fact that large firms might react 
differently depending on liquidity when the crisis arrives. It is claimed that large firms are 
likely to have access to more sources of finance than small firms. Specifically we will find 
out whether large liquid firms extend more or less trade credit than small liquid firms and 
how this varies when the crisis arrives.
Regarding the explanatory variables, in column 4 we can see that again results do not 
change compared to column 2. The estimated coefficients of Liquidity and Sales Growth 
are the only ones that are statistically significant and have the same sign and magnitude 
as the baseline results: –0.0063 and –0.0409 respectively. However, the estimated 
coefficient of the size dummy for large firms, which was statistically significant in the 
previous specification, is no longer statistically significant. Interpretations of these two 
statistically significant regressors are the same ones that we gave above.
Now we turn to the interaction terms between our slack variable and the crisis years: only 
the estimated coefficient of liquidity and the year 2008 is statistically significant, as in the 
baseline results. This coefficient, however, is higher: 0.0216, meaning that in this 
specification the negative effect of liquidity on AR will be more reduced since we have 
higher interaction coefficient for the year 2008.
Now we will analyse the new interaction terms. Out of them, only two are statistically 
significant: the estimated coefficient of the interaction between liquidity and size and the 
estimated coefficient of the interaction between the crisis year 2008 and size. How do we 
interpret these coefficients? First, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between 
liquidity and size is negative. We know that liquidity has a negative effect on AR. How does 
this effect vary when the firm is large? As this term is negative, large firms have a more 
negative effect of liquidity on trade credit than small firms. This is consistent with the fact 
that both liquidity and large size have a negative effect on AR and that in Chart 1 we saw that 
large firms extend less trade credit. Second, the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
term between the crisis year and the size large dummy is positive. How do we interpret 
this effect? We know that the year start of the crisis, 2008, has a positive effect on AR. This 
effect is reinforced if the firm is large. That is, the crisis in 2008 has a more positive effect 
on the extension of trade credit for large firms than for small firms.
Now we split the sample in two subsamples: the first has firms with less than 250 
employees, which constitutes 87% of the original sample, while the second subsample has 
firms with 250 or more employees. Table 3 shows us the results for both subsamples using 
the OLS and the FE methods. As mentioned above, the idea of splitting the sample by size 
is that large liquid firms might react differently from small liquid firms when the crisis 
arrives. Also, this distinction is important because in general large firms have less financial 
constraints than small firms since the former can rely on sources of external finance that 
the latter cannot.
Regarding the explanatory variables, we see that Sales growth and Liquidity remain 
statistically significant for both subsamples. The negative effect of these two variables is 
slightly stronger for large firms (coefficients are more negative or higher in absolute value). 
Thus, the difference of trade credit extended between large firms whose sales are growing 
(large firms with high liquidity) and large firms that have low sales growth (low liquidity) is 
higher that this same difference in small firms. Additionally, we have a new explanatory 
5.2 RESULTS BY SIZE
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variable whose estimated coefficient becomes statistically significant under this 
specification: Equity, whose estimated coefficient is negative. This implies that firms with 
high equity extend less trade credit.
When we look at the interaction terms in both samples, we see that results found in the 
previous part only hold for the small subsample, since the coefficients are quite similar and 
have the same significance. This does not happen for the large subsample. Why could the 
baseline results be only applied to small firms and not to large ones? One possible 
interpretation could be this one: let us consider the case of a large firm that is a supplier. If 
this firm has a small firm as a client, the supplier will have more bargaining power, since it is 
large and it is less dependent on its client than its client is on the supplier. On the other hand, 
the small firm has little bargaining power and does not have too many options and thus it has 
to accept the conditions of the large firm. Now, if the large supplier firm has another large 
firm as a client, what would happen when the supplier does not want to provide trade credit 
but the client wants to take it? It will depend on the bargaining power of the firms, but 
assuming that the provider does not want to extend trade credit, as the client is a large firm, 
it can have access to other sources of external finance. However, this situation does not 
happen when we consider a small or medium firm as a supplier. As they do not have many 
clients, they could be more dependent on their clients than large firms are. Thus, when the 
client is a large firm, the supplier has to extend more trade credit even it does not want to.
Now we will analyse trade credit taken by firms. In this case, our dependent variable is AP 
and we will regress it on some controls, year dummies, our financial slack variable and the 
interaction between this slack variable and the crisis years. All controls, as always, are 
lagged one period to reduce a possible multicollineality problem. Our financial slack 
variable, EFD, is defined as the difference of capital expenditures and cash flow scaled by 
capital assets. That is, the proportion of new investments that are not covered by the cash 
6 Accounts payable
4
Constant  0.2339*** (14.19) 0.2197*** (52.56)  0.2249*** (4.13) 0.2379*** (28.34)
Age   0.0005*** (6.25) 0.0000 (-0.60)   0.0006*** (4.39) 0.0002** (2.09)
Sales growth -0.0117*** (-7.02) -0.0053*** (-3.75) -0.0179*** (-3.09) -0.0092*** (-3.82)
Net pro?t margin   0.0009*** (2.98) 0.0001 (0.74)   -0.0150 (-0.71) -0.0127 (-1.53)
Long term liabilities / 
Assets
-0.1268*** (-14.25) 0.0067 (0.89) -0.0732*** (-2.95) -0.0180 (-1.16)
Equity / Assets -0.0224*** (-3.37) -0.0214*** (-2.95) -0.0413** (-2.37) -0.0353** (-2.22)
Liquidity -0.1526*** (-17.51) -0.0445*** (-6.35) -0.1925*** (-8.65) -0.0475** (-2.55)
Liquidity * year 2008   0.0626*** (4.54) 0.0215* (1.92)   -0.0022 (-0.07) -0.0198 (-0.97)
Liquidity * year 2009   0.0434*** (2.98) -0.0117 (-0.95)   0.0503 (1.40) 0.0229 (0.96)
Liquidity * year 2010   0.0447*** (2.83) -0.0081 (-0.61)   0.0790** (2.03) 0.0193 (0.67)
Estimation method
R-squared
Observations
Firms
Small ?rms Large ?rms
1 2 3
OLS
0.1392
69,000
10,325
FE
0.0029
69,000
10,325
OLS FE
0.3089
9,461
1,531
0.0357
9,461
1,531
TRADE CREDIT EXTENDED BY FIRMS (according to size) TABLE 3
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
NOTE: This table presents estimates from an unbalanced panel regressions explaining ?rm-level annual trade credit provided for the period 1994-2010 according 
to size. Small ?rms are those with less than 250 employees and large ?rms are those with 250 or more employees. The dependent variable is Accounts Receivable 
over Sales. The ?rst and third columns show the estimates using OLS, for small and large ?rms respectively, and the second and fourth ones using FE. Liquidity is 
calculated as the sum of Cash and Short term ?nancial assets scaled by Total assets. All controls are lagged one period. Standard errors in parenthesis, next to the 
coef?cients. ***, ** and * indicate signi?cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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flow over the actual capital assets. We define capital expenditures as the increase in 
capital assets from the previous to the actual year.
Unlike Accounts Receivable, Accounts Payable does not vary significantly with size. There is 
not a clear pattern of how AP varies according to the size of the firm. In Chart 3, similar to 
Chart 1 but for AP, we can see this feature of the data. In Chart 4 we can see the coefficients 
of the year dummies of trade credit taken during the last years: they are very stable until the 
arrival of the crisis: from 2008 to 2010 they increase 0.048. However, the biggest increase is 
from 2008 to 2009: 0.0583, whilst from 2009 to 2010 it decreases a little bit. Hence, we can 
say that the arrival of the crisis has had an impact of the use of trade credit.
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results for AP using EFD as slack variable. All controls, 
but Age and EFD, are statistically significant. We have that the control variables that affect 
the use of trade credit are Sales Growth, Net Profit Margin, Long Term Debt, Equity and the 
large size dummy, all of them negatively. Now let us turn to the interpretation of these 
coefficients. Firstly, firms with high sales growth are likely to be expanding and growing 
and that type of firms is not short of funds. It is logical then that these firms take less trade 
credit, since the more you growth, the more liquidity you should have and then the less 
trade credit you should need to take. Secondly, firms with high net profit margin probably 
have more liquidity, since they earn more for their economic activity and thus the reason 
they take less trade credit is the same one as firms with high sales growth. We also have 
that suppliers might not want to extend trade credit to firms that have too much long term 
debt. So there is a clear negative relationship between long term debt and use of trade 
credit, mainly because suppliers will not provide trade credit to this type of firms. Regarding 
Equity, firms with high Equity might have capacity to retain earnings, and thus, increase 
SIZE COEFFICIENTS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AT 95% FOR TRADE CREDIT TAKEN CHART 3
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Reserves. These reserves can be used when the firm needs finance and, in this situation, 
instead of recurring to their suppliers to ask for trade credit, these firms just use their 
reserves. Finally, the estimated coefficient of the large size dummy is negative as well, 
meaning that large firms take less trade credit than small firms, ceteris paribus. As we 
know, large firms can have access to other sources of external finance, and thus it is pretty 
straightforward that they will take less trade credit than small firms.
We see in Table 4 that the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms between our slack 
variable and the crisis years are not statistically significant. As this happens, we change the 
specification and perform the same regression as before, using other variables as the financial 
slack variable. We use the following variables as financial slack variable for AP: Short term 
bank debt, Long term bank debt and financial expenses. The logic for which we have chosen 
these variables is the same as explained before: firms with too much bank debt in the short 
run might want to increase their trade credit taken when the crisis arrives, because in the 
crisis banks are not willing to extend more credit to them, as they have already too much 
debt. The same logic applies to the other two variables. However, after we perform the 
regressions with these three variables, results do not change compared to the EFD case: the 
estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are not statistically significant, suggesting 
that there are no variables that make firms take more or less trade credit when the crisis 
arrives. Thus, there is a big puzzle in Accounts Payable, because of the absence of a variable 
that changes the willingness to take trade credit when the crisis arrives, unlike Accounts 
Receivable in which we do have this variable. One possible explanation for this fact is that in 
the trade credit market, supply dominates demand in the sense that when a provider is willing 
to give trade credit, the client is going to accept it, but the opposite is not necessarily true. 
Clients with needs of trade credit are not necessarily going to be able to take trade credit, 
since the supplier might be reluctant to extend it. Even more, the mere willingness to take 
more trade credit might be a negative signal to the supplier, since this could be interpret as if 
the firm were doing badly in the market. This effect that happens normally is reinforced in the 
crisis, in which banks are more reluctant to give credit and firms need it more.
Constant  0.5301*** (10.36) 0.4905*** (11.33)
Age   0.0004 (1.44) -0.0001 (-0.08)
Sales growth -0.0250*** (-2.88) -0.0249*** (-2.80)
Net pro?t margin   -0.0013 (-0.25) -0.0076** (-2.11)
Long term liabilities / Assets -0.1873*** (-6.64) -0.0871*** (-3.51)
Equity / Assets -0.3251*** (-17.65) -0.1546*** (-7.56)
EFD 0.0036** (2.12) 0.0010 (0.72)
Large ?rm (size dummy) -0.0196* (-1.89)
EFD * year 2008   -0.0050 (-1.02) 0.0003 (0.06)
EFD * year 2009 -0.0026 (-0.38) -0.0028 (-0.55)
EFD * year 2010 -0.0022 (-0.38) 0.004 (0.83)
Estimation method
R-squared
Observations
Firms
OLS
0.1739
55,705
9,602
FE
0.0119
55,705
9,602
1 2
TRADE CREDIT TAKEN BY FIRMS TABLE 4
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
NOTE: this table presents estimates from an unbalanced panel regressions explaining ?rm-level annual trade credit taken for the period 1994-2010. The dependent 
variable is Accounts Payable over Purchases. The ?rst column shows the estimates using OLS and the second using FE. EFD is calculated as the proportion of 
capital expenditures that are not ?nanced with the cash ?ow. To see a exact de?nition of EFD, see Table 1. All controls are lagged one period. Standard errors in 
parenthesis, next to the coef?cients. ***, ** and * indicate signi?cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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What happens when banks cannot lend due to an external shock in their credit supply? 
This is one of the two concerns of the paper and to be able to study it, we analyse one 
close substitute for bank credit, trade credit. This type of credit is the credit given by 
suppliers to customers in the form of the deferment of the payment for the delivered 
goods, so that firms pay their supplier some time after they have received the goods. 
The other important aspect that we want to analyse is the determinants, patterns and 
evolution of trade credit in Spain during the last 15 years.
For the AR results, we can say that firms with more liquidity and higher sales growth 
extend less trade credit than others. Regarding the first result, we can think of this as the 
fact that firms that have more liquidity do not want to extend too much trade credit because 
they want to protect themselves against negative shocks that might arise. This is consistent 
with one of Keynes’ motives for demand of liquidity, that says that firms demand liquidity 
to provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen opportunities 
of advantageous purchases, and also to hold an asset of which the value is fixed in terms of 
money to meet a subsequent liability fixed in terms of money, are further motives for holding 
cash.2 This interpretation is consistent with the fact that the estimated fixed effect 
coefficient of liquidity in negative, which tells us that the same firm reduces their trade 
credit extended when it has more liquidity than before. Alternatively, we could have a 
reverse causality problem in this case: firms that extend too much trade credit have low 
levels of liquidity.
About the second result, firms with higher sales growth extend less trade credit. We could 
interpret sales growth as a proxy for past performance: the higher the sales growth is, the 
better the performance of the firm. Thus, if the clients of the firm are doing very well in their 
activities, the firm is probably going to sale more to them. And since the clients are doing 
very well too, they are not going to need much trade credit, since they will prefer to pay at 
the moment of the transaction if they can. Thus, with a good past performance of the firm 
and its clients, trade credit is going to decrease with sales growth. Another possible 
interpretation is that firms that have high sales growth have more growth opportunities as 
well. Thus, firms with more growth opportunities will be able to choose who to supply to, 
since they have a wide variety of clients where to choose from. And the supplier will choose 
firms that tend to pay with cash, instead of firms that use trade credit.
Finally, our last important result is the interaction coefficient between liquidity and the year 
2008. This estimated coefficient of this regressor is statistically significant and positive. 
One possible interpretation of this result could be that firms, at the start of the crisis, 
decide to extend more trade credit than before if they have lots of liquidity, thinking that 
this crisis is going to be temporary and thus they do not mind increasing their trade credit 
provision. However, as the crisis becomes deeper and firms get to know that it is going to 
last very long, they decide to stop acting as bank substitutes and that is why they do not 
do the same in the following years, 2009 and 2010.
Finally, in the last section, we perform our regression and use External Finance Dependence 
as our financial slack variable. Regarding the controls, we find that the estimated 
coefficients of Sales Growth, Net Profit Margin, Long Term Liabilities and Equity are 
negative and statistically significant. Firstly, firms with high sales growth are likely to be 
expanding and growing and these firms have liquidity and thus take less trade credit. The 
same happens for firms with high net profit margin. Regarding long term debt, suppliers 
7 Conclusion
2  J. Keynes (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, c. 15
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might not want to extend trade credit to firms that have too much long term debt. Firms 
with high equity might not need to increase their trade credit taken since, as they have high 
equity, they could increase their reserve and use them when they need finance. In this 
same regression, no estimated coefficient of the interaction terms between our slack 
variable, EFD, and the crisis years is statistically significant, and we proceed to change our 
financial slack variable. After considering several variables as candidates for the financial 
slack variable, results do not change, since the estimated coefficients of the interaction 
terms remain being not statistically significant.
The big puzzle in Accounts Payable is the absence of a variable that changes the willingness 
to take trade credit when the crisis arrives, unlike Accounts Receivable in which we do 
have this variable. One possible explanation for this fact is that in the variation seen in 
trade credit market with the arrival of the crisis, supply dominates demand in the sense 
that when a provider is willing to give trade credit, the client is going to accept it, but the 
opposite is not necessarily true. Clients with needs of trade credit are not necessarily 
going to be able to take more trade credit, since the supplier might be reluctant to extend 
it. Even more, the mere willingness to take trade credit might be a negative signal to the 
supplier, since this could be interpret as if the firm were doing badly in the market.
In this paper, we have studied both dimensions of trade credit: trade credit extended and 
taken. We have been more successful in the first one, since we have found that depending 
on a variable (liquidity), firms respond differently regarding extending trade credit when the 
crisis arrives. However, this does not happen for trade credit taken. Of course, there are 
other perspectives that could be taken to analyse trade credit. In this paper, we have 
ignored the joint decision of taken and given trade credit, which could lead to other 
important results, as well as the fact that firms might decide on bank and trade credit 
jointly. This paper could be a first step in analysing with more detail the demand of trade 
credit and could be complemented with future research that might take different 
perspectives and approaches, as the ones given above, in analysing the trade credit 
market to improve the already vast existing literature about trade credit.
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